Analysis of Root of Title and Bona Fide Purchaser Doctrine under Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others

A Legal Analysis of Root of Title and Bona Fide Purchaser Doctrine under Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others

ISSUE

Whether an appellant's root of title is valid in light of constitutional and judicial requirements, and whether such a party qualifies as a bona fide purchaser for value where the title may have been acquired through an unlawful process.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court decision in Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others provides authoritative guidance on the legal requirements for establishing good title and the parameters of the bona fide purchaser doctrine in Kenya.

ANALYSIS

1. The Root of Title Must Be Lawful

The Supreme Court in Dina Management emphasized that the first and foundational step in determining the validity of a party’s title is an inquiry into the root of title, beginning with the initial allotment or alienation of the land. The Court held that any party claiming to be a bona fide purchaser for value must demonstrate that the entire chain of title is free from legal defects.

“To establish whether the appellant is a bona fide purchaser for value therefore, we must first go to the root of the title, right from the first allotment...” (Dina Management, para 94)

This approach places the burden on the purchaser or holder of the title to ensure that the title was derived from lawful processes, and not merely on the existence of a registered title.

2. A Title Is Not Indefeasible If Acquired Unlawfully

The Court further clarified that a title deed, though presumed valid, does not enjoy automatic indefeasibility if the process leading to its issuance violated the law. The legitimacy of the title is conditional upon the legality of the steps leading up to its registration.

“The title or lease is an end product of a process. If the process that was followed prior to issuance of the title did not comply with the law, then such a title cannot be held as indefeasible.” (Dina Management, para 110)

Thus, a party cannot rely solely on possession of a title deed to assert ownership where the procedural integrity of that title is in doubt.

3. Constitutional Limits on the Right to Property

While Article 40(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to acquire and own property, Article 40(6) introduces an important qualification: this protection does not extend to property found to have been unlawfully acquired.

“Article 40 of the Constitution entitles every person to the right to property, subject to the limitations set out therein. Article 40(6) limits the rights as not extending them to any property that has been found to have been unlawfully acquired.” (Dina Management, para 111)

Therefore, a party holding a title obtained through fraud, illegality, or irregular allocation cannot rely on constitutional protection to shield such property rights.

CONCLUSION

The legal position affirmed by the Supreme Court in Dina Management makes it clear that:

• A title deed, while a key document of ownership, must originate from a lawful process for it to be upheld.
• The doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value does not apply in cases where the root of title is tainted by illegality or irregularity.
• Article 40(6) of the Constitution expressly removes protection from such titles.

Accordingly, where an appellant’s root of title is found to be defective—particularly at the point of initial allotment or acquisition—the title is vulnerable to nullification, and the appellant cannot invoke the bona fide purchaser doctrine as a defense.

Notably, it is worth recomending that in all property transactions and litigation involving leasehold or freehold interests, practitioners and claimants must undertake thorough due diligence to trace the history of the title from first allocation. Where evidence of irregular or unlawful acquisition arises, the title is likely to be invalidated, regardless of registration status.

 

RENEWAL AND EXTENSION OF LEASEHOLD PROPERTIES IN KENYA

INTRODUCTION

In Kenya, land ownership is governed under two main land tenure systems:

1. Freehold Tenure, and
2. Leasehold Tenure.

1. Freehold Tenure

Freehold tenure refers to absolute ownership of land for an unlimited duration. Once land is acquired under this system, the owner has complete rights to the land and can pass it on to their heirs, sell it, or develop it as they please, subject to planning and zoning laws.

However, it is important to note that freehold ownership is restricted to Kenyan citizens.

• Foreign nationals, including foreign companies, are not allowed to hold freehold land in Kenya under the Constitution and the Land Control Act.
• This restriction is meant to protect Kenyan land from foreign control and ensure its availability for future generations.

2. Leasehold Tenure

Leasehold tenure refers to a system where land is owned by the government (national or county), and an individual or entity is granted the right to use the land for a specific period, usually 33, 50, 66, or 99 years, depending on the terms set out in the lease.

• The lessee (person granted the lease) is required to pay annual land rent to the government.
• At the expiry of the lease term, the land reverts to the lessor (usually the government) unless the lease is extended or renewed.
• For non-citizens, the maximum lease term allowed is 99 years, as per the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

 

RENEWAL OF EXPIRED LEASES

Renewal of a lease occurs after the original lease term has expired. This usually happens when the lessee fails to apply for an extension of the lease before its expiry.

• In such cases, the lessee must apply to renew the lease, which is treated as a new application, rather than a continuation of the previous lease.
• This process is not automatic and the government may impose new conditions, including:
• Change of land use,
• New valuation and rent assessment,
• Compliance with current planning and zoning regulations.

Key point: Failure to renew an expired lease in time could result in loss of legal interest in the property, and the government may allocate the land to another party.

 

EXTENSION OF LEASES (BEFORE EXPIRY)

This is the preferred and recommended process, where the lessee applies to extend the lease before it expires. This ensures continuity of ownership and avoids legal disputes or forfeiture of land rights.

Legal Framework

Under Section 13 of the Land Act, 2012, the National Land Commission (NLC) is required to:

1. Notify the registered lessee (owner) of the land at least five (5) years before the lease expires.
2. If the lessee does not respond within one (1) year, the NLC must:
• Publish the notice in two national newspapers,
• The lessee then has six (6) months from the date of publication to respond.

If the lessee still does not respond, the land may be treated as reverted public land and may be allocated to other individuals or entities.

Importance: Lessees are strongly advised to monitor their lease terms and initiate extensions early to avoid complications.

 

PROCESS FOR RENEWAL OR EXTENSION OF LEASES

This process involves multiple stakeholders including licensed professionals and government departments.

Step-by-Step Guide:

1. Engage a Licensed Physical Planner
• The lessee must hire a registered physical planner to prepare and submit planning documents.
• This includes requesting a Planning Brief and filling out PPA2 forms from the County Government where the land is located.
2. Submission of Planning Documents
• The Planning Brief and PPA2 forms (in triplicate) are submitted to the:
• Director of Land Administration (national government) or,
• County Land Administrator, depending on who owns the land.
3. Circulation of the Application
• The Land Administrator issues a circulation letter requesting input from:
• The Director of Physical Planning,
• The Director of Surveys,
• The County Physical Planner (in devolved units),
• These stakeholders review and provide comments or objections.
4. Letter of No Objection
• If no issues are raised, a Letter of No Objection is issued, signaling that the lease extension can proceed.
5. Provisional Approval
• The Director of Land Administration issues Provisional Approval for the extension or renewal of the lease, subject to final conditions being met.
6. Re-Survey of the Property
• A registered surveyor re-surveys the land to:
• Confirm boundaries,
• Update any changes,
• Generate a new Registry Index Map (RIM) for the parcel.
7. Re-Valuation of Land
• The government valuer conducts a valuation to determine:
• The current market value of the land,
• The new annual rent payable,
• Any premiums due to change in land use or location.
8. Final Approval
• After the re-survey and valuation, the Director of Land Administration issues the Final Approval for the lease extension.
9. Preparation of Legal Documents
• A licensed advocate prepares:
• The Surrender document (to relinquish the old lease),
• A new Lease Agreement for the extended term.
10. Issuance of New Title

• Upon registration, a new Leasehold Title Deed or Lease Instrument is issued, reflecting the new term and updated conditions.

 

CONCLUSION

The renewal and extension of leasehold titles in Kenya is a structured process that involves compliance with planning, survey, and legal requirements. Property owners should:

• Track their lease expiry dates,
• Initiate extension applications at least five years before expiry,
• Ensure compliance with all land use and planning regulations.

Engaging qualified professionals such as physical planners, land surveyors, valuers, and advocates is essential to ensure a smooth and successful process.

 

DISCLAIMER

This article is intended for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Property owners are encouraged to seek guidance from qualified land law professionals. 

 

Legal Analysis on Procedural Fairness in Redundancy: The Case of Mwikali v Flame Tree Africa Limited [2025] KEELRC 1809 (KLR)

I. Introduction

This memorandum analyzes the decision in Mwikali v Flame Tree Africa Limited, where the Employment and Labour Relations Court found that the Respondent’s redundancy process was procedurally flawed despite issuing a formal one-month notice. The ruling emphasizes the importance of genuine notice, consultation, and fair implementation of redundancy under Kenyan employment law.

II. Issues

1. Whether a redundancy notice that purports to give one month’s notice is valid where the employee is effectively dismissed on the same day.
2. Whether instructing an employee to hand over company property on the same day as a redundancy notice nullifies the notice.
3. Whether the redundancy process adhered to the procedural requirements under the Employment Act.

III. Relevant Law

• Employment Act, 2007 (Kenya):
• Section 40(1): Sets out mandatory procedural requirements for redundancy, including:
• Issuance of at least one-month prior notice to the employee and the labour officer;
• Consultations with the employee or their representative;
• Criteria for selection (e.g., seniority, skills, etc.);
• Payment of redundancy dues (severance pay, accrued leave, etc.).
• Article 41 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Guarantees the right to fair labour practices.
• Case Law Principles: Courts have emphasized that redundancy must be both substantively justified and procedurally fair.

IV. Case Summary: Mwikali v Flame Tree Africa Ltd [2025] KEELRC 1809 (KLR)

Facts:

• The Claimant received a redundancy notice letter dated 18 March 2021, indicating that she would be declared redundant after one month.
• However, in the same letter, the Claimant was instructed to surrender all company property by close of business on the same day.
• The Claimant challenged the validity of the redundancy process, arguing that it was procedurally unfair and not genuine.

Court’s Findings:

• The Court held that despite the formal indication of a one-month notice, the instruction to hand over company property on the same day indicated a constructive termination.
• The employer’s conduct showed it had no intention of retaining the Claimant during the purported notice period.
• The Court found that:
• No genuine notice was given;
• There was no opportunity for consultation, as required under Section 40 of the Act;
• The redundancy process was procedurally flawed and unfair.

V. Analysis

1. Form vs Substance in Redundancy Notice

This case confirms that redundancy notice must be real and effective — not just procedural formality. Simply stating “one month” on paper while forcing an immediate handover is evidence of bad faith and constructive dismissal.

2. Immediate Handovers Signal Immediate Termination

By instructing the Claimant to surrender all company property on the same day, the Respondent demonstrated that the employment relationship was immediately severed, contrary to the purported notice. This undermines the employee’s right to notice and time to adjust or consult.

3. Violation of Section 40 of the Employment Act

The Respondent failed to:

• Conduct genuine consultations;
• Allow the notice period to be effectively served;
• Comply with the spirit and letter of redundancy procedures.

4. Breach of Fair Labour Practices

Such conduct also violates Article 41 of the Constitution, which protects employees from arbitrary dismissal and ensures dignity in the termination process.

VI. Conclusion

The decision in Mwikali underscores the principle that redundancy must be both procedurally and substantively fair. Merely issuing a notice letter is not sufficient — the employer's actions must reflect a genuine intention to follow due process, including providing actual time for notice, conducting consultations, and treating the employee fairly during the transition.

VII. Recommendations

For employers to remain compliant:

1. Ensure the redundancy notice is genuine — do not require handovers or exit procedures until the notice period has lapsed or the employee has been properly relieved.
2. Conduct proper consultations with affected employees and the labour officer as per Section 40.
3. Allow employees to serve the full notice period or pay notice in lieu if immediate exit is intended — but be explicit and transparent.
4. Document all steps in the redundancy process to demonstrate good faith and legal compliance.
5. Train HR and management on the legal requirements of redundancy to avoid legal exposure and reputational damage.

 

Legal Analysis/Commentary on the extension of probationary contracts and procedural fairness under the Employment Act: The case of Pamba v Kenya HospitalAssociation [2025] KEELRC 1776 (KLR)

Full Case: Pamba v Kenya HospitalAssociation [2025] KEELRC 1776 (KLR)

This case involved the unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment and raised important questions regarding the validity of probationary contract extensions and the procedural safeguards required under the Employment Act.

Background

The Claimant was employed by the Respondents and, at the time of termination, had completed his initial probationary period. The Respondents, however, contended that the Claimant was still under probation and therefore not entitled to the procedural protections afforded under Section 41 of the Employment Act, which requires an employer to give an employee an opportunity to be heard before termination.

The Respondents further relied on Section 42(1) of the Act, which historically excluded probationary employees from the protections of Section 41. However, the Court noted that Section 42(1) had already been declared unconstitutional, thereby removing the legal basis for denying a hearing to employees on probation.

Issue of Probation Extension

Central to the dispute was whether the Claimant’s probationary period had been validly extended.

• The Respondents argued that the probationary period had been extended, and thus the Claimant remained on probation.
• The Claimant disputed this, maintaining that any extension was void, as it was not mutually agreed upon, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 42(2) of the Employment Act.

Section 42(2) provides that a probationary contract may only be extended with the mutual consent of both parties, and such extension must be communicated in writing. Furthermore, the Respondents’ own internal HR policy required any probationary extension to be formalized through specific procedures, which were not followed in this case.

Court’s Findings

The Court found in favour of the Claimant and held that:

1. The probationary period had lapsed by the time of termination.
2. There was no valid extension of the probationary contract in accordance with Section 42(2) of the Employment Act.
3. The failure to mutually agree to the extension and to comply with the Respondents' internal HR policy rendered the purported extension null and void.
4. Upon expiry of the initial probationary period, the Claimant was deemed to have been automatically confirmed in his position.

As such, the Claimant was entitled to procedural fairness under Section 41 of the Employment Act, including the right to be informed of the reasons for termination and to be heard.

Conclusion and Relief Granted

The Court concluded that the termination was substantively and procedurally unfair, having failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements under the law. In light of these violations, the Court awarded the Claimant the maximum compensation for unlawful termination, reinforcing the principle that employers must strictly adhere to both statutory and internal procedures when extending probation or terminating employment.

Key Takeaways:

• Probation extensions must be mutually agreed and in writing under Section 42(2).
• Section 42(1), which excluded probationary employees from a fair hearing, has been declared unconstitutional, restoring full procedural rights even to probationary employees.
• Automatic confirmation occurs upon expiry of the probation period where no valid extension exists.
• Employers must adhere to internal HR policies as well as statutory requirements when dealing with employment contracts.

Legal analysis of the Supreme Court decision in Okoiti v Portside Freight Terminals Limited & 12 Others (Petition E011 of 2024) [2025] KESC 44 (KLR).

Background

• The Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) wanted to establish a second bulk grain handling facility at the Port of Mombasa. The current facility was operated by Grain Bulk Handlers Limited (GBHL). KPA desired to diversify and introduce competition, reduce monopoly risk, and improve strategic / security posture. (Kenya Law)
• KPA applied to use the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure (SPPP) under Section 114A of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPAD Act) instead of a competitive procurement procedure. 
• Portside Freight Terminals Limited was eventually granted a license (plus wayleave) to establish this second grain terminal, via use of SPPP. 
• Several other parties (including applicants who submitted unsolicited proposals, other potential bidders, and public interest groups) challenged this, arguing that the procurement process violated constitutional values and articles, including the obligation under Article 227 that procurement be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost‑effective. Also, that the Port Master Plan (2017‑2047) had been undermined because the location choice (Mombasa Port) was not consistent with published plan which had Dongo Kundu or Lamu as envisaged sites.
• The case proceeded through the High Court, then the Court of Appeal, and finally to the Supreme Court of Kenya.

Legal Issues

Among the key issues before the Supreme Court were:

1. Jurisdiction – whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Article 163(4)(a) of the Constitution to entertain the appeal, given that constitutional issues were raised. 
2. Locus standi – whether the appellant (and public interest organizations) had standing (including under Articles 22 & 258) to bring the petition, whether they could do so on behalf of other parties.
3. Validity of the invocation of SPPP under Section 114A – whether KPA’s use of that procedure was lawful; whether the conditions under that section (e.g., exceptional requirements, public interest or national security) were satisfied. 
4. Compliance with Article 227 of the Constitution – whether the procurement process was "fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, cost‑effective." 
5. Master Plan / Public Participation – whether variations of the Port Master Plan (especially the site locations) required fresh public participation; whether the master plan is binding; whether deviation amounted to unconstitutional variation. 
6. Ultra vires actions / usurpation of roles – whether the Board of Directors of KPA usurped functions of the accounting officer; whether decisions to issue license / wayleave were made outside the legal authority.

The Supreme Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court ruled, among other things:

• The Petition (E011 of 2024) was allowed. 
• The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it had found that the use of SPPP under Section 114A breached the Constitution. In effect, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the invocation of SPPP in this case was unconstitutional and void. 
• The decision of Kenya Ports Authority to grant Portside Freight Terminals Limited the license to establish the facility via the SPPP was inconsistent with Articles 10(2)(c) (national values and principles of governance such as transparency, accountability), 201(a) (public finance principles), and 227(1) (public procurement principles). 
• The Court ordered that any procurement for the second bulk grain handling facility at the Port of Mombasa must be done strictly in accordance with the law through competitive bidding. The decisions / license granted under SPPP in this instance were null and void, and cannot proceed. 
• On costs: since this was a public interest matter, each party was to bear its own costs. 

Reasoning (Supreme Court’s Analysis)

Some of the key legal reasoning points include:

• Constitution as Supreme Law: Any law that conflicts with the Constitution is void to the extent of inconsistency (Article 2 of the Constitution). The court emphasised this supremacy, especially in procurement, which often involves public funds. 
• SPPP under Section 114A: While Section 114A and Regulation 107 provide for special procurement in exceptional cases (where open competitive procurement is impracticable, costly, or impossible), these exceptional requirements must be demonstrated. The Supreme Court found that KPA did not satisfactorily show that exceptional circumstances existed in this case to justify SPPP. Thus the invocation was not justified. 
• Procurement Principles: Article 227 requires that procurement systems adhere to fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness, and cost‑effectiveness. These are non‑negotiable constitutional mandates, even when alternative procurement methods (like SPPP) are being used. The Supreme Court held that the process here failed in those respects. 
• Master Plan and Public Participation: The court drew a distinction between master plans (strategic plans) vs laws/statutes. While master plans have high normative value, they are not laws in themselves, so failing to adhere to every detail of a master plan does not always constitute constitutional violation. However, where a variation is made, especially for public policy or procurement, and such variation affects rights or stakeholders, public participation may become necessary. In this case, the Court held that the change from the planned sites without adequate stakeholder/public participation was problematic.
• Role of Accounting Officer / Board Powers: The Supreme Court clarified the legal roles: the accounting officer (or prosecuting entity) is responsible for procurement, and the Board’s powers are limited. If the Board’s decisions or approval go beyond what law allows, or substitute for the accounting officer, they may be ultra vires. In this case, some actions exceeded legal powers.

Implications and Significance

The decision is significant for procurement law and constitutional governance in Kenya. Some of the implications:

1. Reaffirmation of Procurement Constitutionalism: It solidifies that procurement, especially of public infrastructure, is not just administrative/tactical but deeply constitutional. Public procurement statutes and regulations must align with constitutional values. There are limits even in “special procurement” regimes.
2. Limits of SPPP / Alternative Procedures: The judgment clarifies that SPPP is not a carte blanche to avoid competitive tendering. The exceptional requirements in law must be satisfied and shown concretely, not merely asserted.
3. Strengthening Public Participation: It emphasizes that strategic planning (e.g. master plans) cannot be disregarded, especially when decisions deviate. Stakeholder/public participation is a constitutional value and may sometimes be mandatory.
4. Scrutiny of Role Usurpation / Accountability: It reminds public entities that they must respect delegated roles (e.g. accounting officer vs Board), and cannot act beyond their legal mandate.
5. Public Interest Litigation: The decision underscores that even entities without direct pecuniary interest can bring petitions, under Articles 22 & 258, to challenge constitutional violations in procurement and public administration.
6. Monopoly, Competition, Security vs Transparency: The judgment balances strategic policy goals like security, food security, diversification with constitutional safeguards like competition, transparency. Even with strategic importance, constitutional values cannot be subordinated.
7. Precedent for Future Procurement Disputes: This will guide procurement entities, the National Treasury, Cabinet Secretaries, Boards, and courts in future on how to apply Section 114A and public procurement regulations. It increases the risk of procurement contracts being challenged and invalidated if procedural and constitutional standards are not met.

Critiques / Potential Weaknesses / Areas of Ambiguity

Even strong decisions have areas that are potentially subject to critique or future clarification:

1. Master Plan Bindingness: The Court says master plans are not themselves laws, so their terms are not always binding, but deviations may require public participation etc. There’s potential ambiguity in when exactly public participation becomes obligatory vs advisable. More precise thresholds would help.
2. Proof of Exceptional Requirements: The standard for demonstrating “exceptional requirements” under Section 114A is that they must be “impossible, impracticable or uneconomical” to comply with the normal procurement rules. What evidence is required to prove these in different contexts may need more guidance.
3. Competition vs National Security / Public Interest: The judgment allows SPPP under conditions related to public interest or national security. But what counts as “national security” or “public interest” in procurement may be broad and thus susceptible to executive overreach. Clearer criteria or guidelines may be needed to avoid misuse.
4. Remedy and Timing: Since tenders and procurement have timelines, delays in challenging may lead to disruptions. Also, the Court’s order that each party bear its own costs (in public interest matters) is appropriate but may reduce incentives for some claimants to bring similar suits, as costs are still a concern.
5. Effect on Investment / Private Sector Expectations: For companies which invested resources anticipating a license under SPPP, this judgment introduces risk. It may deter some private investment proposals unless there is very clear process and transparency.
6. Role of Unsolicited Proposals: The decision touched upon unsolicited proposals (privately initiated), but left somewhat unclear how those should be handled in relation to SPPP or PPP frameworks. Better doctrine needed for unsolicited proposals within Kenyan procurement law.

Academic Reflections

From a theoretical perspective, this case illustrates tensions in constitutional democracies between delegated powers, procedural fairness, and executive discretion. It demonstrates that even statutory exceptions (like SPPP) must be interpreted in light of constitutional values. It also points toward an evolving jurisprudence in Kenya where public resources (including procurement) are increasingly being understood not only in regulatory-legal terms but constitutional ones.

The case is a useful study in constitutional checks on procurement, environment of checks & balances, and the importance of administrative law principles (fairness, legitimate expectation, ultra vires) in procurement matters.

 Full case available here 

Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Payment by Installments – A case Analysis of Masongo & Another v Riruta Gardens [2025] KEHC 10371 (KLR)

1. Introduction & Scope
The opinion reviews the High Court’s decision in Masongo & Another v Riruta Gardens focusing on two primary issues:

• Enforceability of arbitral awards within the statutory 90-day setting-aside period.
• Conditions under which courts may allow judgment debts to be paid by installments (ogekalaw.blogspot.com).

2. Background

• The arbitral award was issued on 11 September 2024.
• Applicants sought enforcement under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act.
• The respondent argued enforcement was premature, as the 90-day window under Section 35(3) had not yet expired. Alternatively, the respondent proposed payment in 24 monthly installments with interest frozen from 11 October 2024. The court’s ruling was delivered on 17 July 2025.

3. Legal Issues Considered

• Whether enforcement can proceed before the expiry of the 90-day period under Section 35(3).
• The evidentiary threshold required for installment payment requests (ogekalaw.blogspot.com).

4. Legal Framework

• Arbitration Act, 1995 (Revised 2010):
• Section 35(3): 90-day window for setting aside awards.
• Section 36: Enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
• Civil Procedure Rules, 2010:
• Order 21 Rule 12(1): Court’s discretion to allow installment payments.
• Relevant Case Law: Freight Forwarders Kenya Ltd v Elsek & Elsek (2012) and Keshavji Jethabhai & Bros Ltd v Saleh Abdulla (1959), highlighting good faith and financial disclosure as preconditions for installment arrangements.

5. Court’s Findings & Analysis

• Enforcement Prematurity: The court held that the mere fact the 90-day period hadn't elapsed does not prohibit enforcement unless an application to set aside is pending—no such application existed in this case (ogekalaw.blogspot.com).
• Installment Payments: The court emphasized that such discretion is only exercised when there is sufficient cause, including:
• Comprehensive financial disclosure (e.g., audited accounts);
• Demonstrated good faith (e.g., partial payments made).
  In this case, the respondent failed to provide any supporting documentation or partial payments, and the court thus denied the installment request.

6. Conclusion

• The arbitral award was recognized as the court's judgment.
• The installment payment proposal was rejected.
• Costs were awarded to the applicants (ogekalaw.blogspot.com).

7. Practical Implications

• For Award Creditors: Enforcement should proceed immediately—no need to wait for the 90-day period to lapse unless there’s a pending setting-aside application.
• For Judgment Debtors Seeking Installments: Must present credible financial evidence, demonstrate good faith, and ideally make part payments; otherwise, such requests are unlikely to succeed (ogekalaw.blogspot.com).
• For Future Contracts & Internal Policies: Businesses should reinforce arbitration clauses and train teams on enforcement procedures to ensure smooth execution post-award.