Background
- The Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) wanted to establish a second bulk grain handling facility at the Port of Mombasa. The current facility was operated by Grain Bulk Handlers Limited (GBHL). KPA desired to diversify and introduce competition, reduce monopoly risk, and improve strategic / security posture. (Kenya Law)
- KPA applied to use the Specially Permitted Procurement Procedure (SPPP) under Section 114A of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPAD Act) instead of a competitive procurement procedure.
- Portside Freight Terminals Limited was eventually granted a license (plus wayleave) to establish this second grain terminal, via use of SPPP.
- Several other parties (including applicants who submitted unsolicited proposals, other potential bidders, and public interest groups) challenged this, arguing that the procurement process violated constitutional values and articles, including the obligation under Article 227 that procurement be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost‑effective. Also, that the Port Master Plan (2017‑2047) had been undermined because the location choice (Mombasa Port) was not consistent with published plan which had Dongo Kundu or Lamu as envisaged sites.
- The case proceeded through the High Court, then the Court of Appeal, and finally to the Supreme Court of Kenya.
Legal Issues
Among the key issues before the Supreme Court were:
- Jurisdiction – whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under Article 163(4)(a) of the Constitution to entertain the appeal, given that constitutional issues were raised.
- Locus standi – whether the appellant (and public interest organizations) had standing (including under Articles 22 & 258) to bring the petition, whether they could do so on behalf of other parties.
- Validity of the invocation of SPPP under Section 114A – whether KPA’s use of that procedure was lawful; whether the conditions under that section (e.g., exceptional requirements, public interest or national security) were satisfied.
- Compliance with Article 227 of the Constitution – whether the procurement process was "fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, cost‑effective."
- Master Plan / Public Participation – whether variations of the Port Master Plan (especially the site locations) required fresh public participation; whether the master plan is binding; whether deviation amounted to unconstitutional variation.
- Ultra vires actions / usurpation of roles – whether the Board of Directors of KPA usurped functions of the accounting officer; whether decisions to issue license / wayleave were made outside the legal authority.
The Supreme Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court ruled, among other things:
- The Petition (E011 of 2024) was allowed.
- The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it had found that the use of SPPP under Section 114A breached the Constitution. In effect, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the invocation of SPPP in this case was unconstitutional and void.
- The decision of Kenya Ports Authority to grant Portside Freight Terminals Limited the license to establish the facility via the SPPP was inconsistent with Articles 10(2)(c) (national values and principles of governance such as transparency, accountability), 201(a) (public finance principles), and 227(1) (public procurement principles).
- The Court ordered that any procurement for the second bulk grain handling facility at the Port of Mombasa must be done strictly in accordance with the law through competitive bidding. The decisions / license granted under SPPP in this instance were null and void, and cannot proceed.
- On costs: since this was a public interest matter, each party was to bear its own costs.
Reasoning (Supreme Court’s Analysis)
Some of the key legal reasoning points include:
- Constitution as Supreme Law: Any law that conflicts with the Constitution is void to the extent of inconsistency (Article 2 of the Constitution). The court emphasised this supremacy, especially in procurement, which often involves public funds.
- SPPP under Section 114A: While Section 114A and Regulation 107 provide for special procurement in exceptional cases (where open competitive procurement is impracticable, costly, or impossible), these exceptional requirements must be demonstrated. The Supreme Court found that KPA did not satisfactorily show that exceptional circumstances existed in this case to justify SPPP. Thus the invocation was not justified.
- Procurement Principles: Article 227 requires that procurement systems adhere to fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness, and cost‑effectiveness. These are non‑negotiable constitutional mandates, even when alternative procurement methods (like SPPP) are being used. The Supreme Court held that the process here failed in those respects.
- Master Plan and Public Participation: The court drew a distinction between master plans (strategic plans) vs laws/statutes. While master plans have high normative value, they are not laws in themselves, so failing to adhere to every detail of a master plan does not always constitute constitutional violation. However, where a variation is made, especially for public policy or procurement, and such variation affects rights or stakeholders, public participation may become necessary. In this case, the Court held that the change from the planned sites without adequate stakeholder/public participation was problematic.
- Role of Accounting Officer / Board Powers: The Supreme Court clarified the legal roles: the accounting officer (or prosecuting entity) is responsible for procurement, and the Board’s powers are limited. If the Board’s decisions or approval go beyond what law allows, or substitute for the accounting officer, they may be ultra vires. In this case, some actions exceeded legal powers.
Implications and Significance
The decision is significant for procurement law and constitutional governance in Kenya. Some of the implications:
- Reaffirmation of Procurement Constitutionalism: It solidifies that procurement, especially of public infrastructure, is not just administrative/tactical but deeply constitutional. Public procurement statutes and regulations must align with constitutional values. There are limits even in “special procurement” regimes.
- Limits of SPPP / Alternative Procedures: The judgment clarifies that SPPP is not a carte blanche to avoid competitive tendering. The exceptional requirements in law must be satisfied and shown concretely, not merely asserted.
- Strengthening Public Participation: It emphasizes that strategic planning (e.g. master plans) cannot be disregarded, especially when decisions deviate. Stakeholder/public participation is a constitutional value and may sometimes be mandatory.
- Scrutiny of Role Usurpation / Accountability: It reminds public entities that they must respect delegated roles (e.g. accounting officer vs Board), and cannot act beyond their legal mandate.
- Public Interest Litigation: The decision underscores that even entities without direct pecuniary interest can bring petitions, under Articles 22 & 258, to challenge constitutional violations in procurement and public administration.
- Monopoly, Competition, Security vs Transparency: The judgment balances strategic policy goals like security, food security, diversification with constitutional safeguards like competition, transparency. Even with strategic importance, constitutional values cannot be subordinated.
- Precedent for Future Procurement Disputes: This will guide procurement entities, the National Treasury, Cabinet Secretaries, Boards, and courts in future on how to apply Section 114A and public procurement regulations. It increases the risk of procurement contracts being challenged and invalidated if procedural and constitutional standards are not met.
Critiques / Potential Weaknesses / Areas of Ambiguity
Even strong decisions have areas that are potentially subject to critique or future clarification:
- Master Plan Bindingness: The Court says master plans are not themselves laws, so their terms are not always binding, but deviations may require public participation etc. There’s potential ambiguity in when exactly public participation becomes obligatory vs advisable. More precise thresholds would help.
- Proof of Exceptional Requirements: The standard for demonstrating “exceptional requirements” under Section 114A is that they must be “impossible, impracticable or uneconomical” to comply with the normal procurement rules. What evidence is required to prove these in different contexts may need more guidance.
- Competition vs National Security / Public Interest: The judgment allows SPPP under conditions related to public interest or national security. But what counts as “national security” or “public interest” in procurement may be broad and thus susceptible to executive overreach. Clearer criteria or guidelines may be needed to avoid misuse.
- Remedy and Timing: Since tenders and procurement have timelines, delays in challenging may lead to disruptions. Also, the Court’s order that each party bear its own costs (in public interest matters) is appropriate but may reduce incentives for some claimants to bring similar suits, as costs are still a concern.
- Effect on Investment / Private Sector Expectations: For companies which invested resources anticipating a license under SPPP, this judgment introduces risk. It may deter some private investment proposals unless there is very clear process and transparency.
- Role of Unsolicited Proposals: The decision touched upon unsolicited proposals (privately initiated), but left somewhat unclear how those should be handled in relation to SPPP or PPP frameworks. Better doctrine needed for unsolicited proposals within Kenyan procurement law.
Academic Reflections
From a theoretical perspective, this case illustrates tensions in constitutional democracies between delegated powers, procedural fairness, and executive discretion. It demonstrates that even statutory exceptions (like SPPP) must be interpreted in light of constitutional values. It also points toward an evolving jurisprudence in Kenya where public resources (including procurement) are increasingly being understood not only in regulatory-legal terms but constitutional ones.
The case is a useful study in constitutional checks on procurement, environment of checks & balances, and the importance of administrative law principles (fairness, legitimate expectation, ultra vires) in procurement matters.
Full case available here